Home Archive Contact
PDF download
Cite article
Share options
Informations, rights and permissions
Issue image
Vol 7, Issue 1, 2017
Pages: 205 - 216
Review paper
See full issue

INTERNACIONALNI UNIVERZITET TRAVNIK U TRAVNIKU
EKONOMSKI FAKULTET TRAVNIK U TRAVNIKU
PRAVNI FAKULTET TRAVNIK U TRAVNIKU
FAKULTET ZA MEDIJE I KOMUNIKACIJE TRAVNIK U TRAVNIKU

u saradnji sa

MIT UNIVERZITET SKOPLJE, SJEVERNA MAKEDONIJA
VEVU, VELEUČILIŠTE LAVOSLAV RUZIČKA U VUKOVARU, HRVATSKA
VELEUČILIŠTE VIMAL, SISAK, HRVATSKA
CKKPI, TRAVNIK, BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA

organizuju

31. MEĐUNARODNU KONFERENCIJU

EKONOMSKE, PRAVNE I MEDIJSKE INTEGRACIJE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE I ZEMALJA ZAPADNOG
BALKANA KAO KLJUČNI POKRETAČ EUROPSKIH VRIJEDNOSTI

12. – 13. decembar 2025. godine

Metrics and citations
Abstract views: 3
PDF Downloads: 1
Google scholar: See link
Article content
  1. Abstract
  2. Disclaimer
Received: 14.04.2017. >> Accepted: 28.04.2017. >> Published: 19.05.2017. Review paper

TEORIJA KOOPERATIVNIH IGARA U ANALIZI MONETARNE I FISKALNE POLITIKE NA PRIMJERU REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE / COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY IN THE ANALYSIS OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY ON EXAMPLE OF REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

By
Krešimir Bošnjak ,
Krešimir Bošnjak

Ekonomski fakultet, University of Zagreb , Zagreb , Croatia

Tunjo Perić
Tunjo Perić

Ekonomski fakultet , University of Zagreb , Zagreb , Croatia

Abstract

The paper explored the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy by using game theory. After the Introduction it is presented methodological frame through theoretical basis of fiscal and monetary policy, and introducing of game theory. After theoretical part, the analysis was conducted using the collected data and then the results of the paper are presented. A function of payments for monetary and fiscal policy have been created on the basis of the perennial data of inflation, employment rate, total liquidity and the rate of government spending in the Republic of Croatia. To obtain the model parameters multiple linear regression has been used. The obtained result, based on the functions of payments for monetary and fiscal policy, generated the matrix of payments. Solving the model as the two players strategic game with the conflict goals using max-min method we could not obtain a Nash equilibrium solution. Therefore we observed the model as a cooperative game and for obtaining the optimal solution we applied SAW method and method TOPSIS. Then we analysed the sensitivity of the obtained results in terms of assumption when a greater impact on the economy has the fiscal policy and in terms of assumption when a greater impact on the economy has monetary policy. The research resulted in one optimal solution. 

The statements, opinions and data contained in the journal are solely those of the individual authors and contributors and not of the publisher and the editor(s). We stay neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.